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Abstract
This paper presents a model of Downsian political competition in which voters
are imperfectly informed about economic fundamentals. In this setting, parties’
choices of platforms inﬂuence voters’ behavior not only through voters’ prefer-
encesoverpolicies, butalsothroughformationoftheirexpectationontheunknown
fundamentals. We show that there exist pure-strategy equilibria in this political
game with asymmetric information at which the two parties’ policies diverge with
positive probability. This result is in contrast with the well-known median voter
theorem in the classical model of Downsian competition. We also study reﬁnement
of equilibria, and identify the perfect equilibria (Selten, 1975) and the strictly per-
fect equilibria (Okada, 1981). The Nash equilibria with the strongest asymmetry
in the parties’ strategies are proved to be strictly perfect.
¤I wish to thank Professor Koichi Tadenuma for his helpful comments and suggestions.
21 Introduction
The classical Downsian model of political competition has a well-known the-
oretical result called Median Voter Theorem (MVT), which states that under
some natural assumptions, two ofﬁce-seeking parties will announce the same
platform: the median voter’s ideal policy. Whereas the model is widely ac-
cepted, an inconsistency between the conclusion of MVT and real phenomena
is often pointed out. In empirical studies, policy divergence, rather than con-
vergence, between parties seems to be dominant. Therefore, it is important to
construct an alternative model that can explain the real data.
With this basic motivation, this paper presents a Downsian electoral model
with two policy alternatives in which voters have only incomplete information
about the value of a “fundamentals” variable affecting the relative effectiveness
of these policies. Two parties observe a realized value of the variable, and then
simultaneously announce their platforms. Observing these platforms, voters
choose a party to votefor. In this setting, parties’ choices of platforms inﬂuence
voters’ behavior not only through voters’ preferences over policies, but also
through formation of their expectation on the fundamentals.
The assumption of incomplete information about the fundamentals on the
side of voters reﬂects the idea that, in actual elections, some data necessary for
evaluation of policies is often unfamiliar to voters, while parties have richer
knowledge obtained perhaps through research activities. In such cases, vot-
ers seem to attribute observed political positions of parties to particular infor-
mation of fundamentals which the parties have probably obtained prior to the
determination of platforms.
For example, when redistributive policy is at issue, the fundamentals vari-
able may summarize information about the extent to which taxation on income
deteriorates the macroeconomic performances by lowering labor incentives.
When there is a stable situation in which a party is “leftist”, i.e., when this
party is more likely to adopt a progressive tax policy than its opponent (the
“rightist”), voters would expect higher average income elasticity of labor from
observation of the leftist party’s choice of the progressive tax than from obser-
vation of the rightist party’s choice of the same policy. This paper is an attempt
to explain how such interactions between strategies and expectation formation
constitute an equilibrium in an election over the general issue.
In this political game with asymmetric information, we identify the pure-
strategy Nash equilibria. We show that there exist Nash equilibria at which
the two parties’ policies diverge with positive probability. We then study re-
ﬁnement of equilibria, and identify the perfect equilibria (Selten, 1975) and
3the strictly perfect equilibria (Okada, 1981). The perfect equilibrium excludes
Nash equilibria at which both parties are very likely to choose a policy that is
unpopular among voters with the prior informationabout fundamentals. The
Nash equilibria exhibiting the strongest asymmetry between parties’ strategies
are strictly perfect. The last result, in particular, is in marked contrast with the
conclusion of MVT.
There are several studies related to the present paper either in concern with
policy divergence or in focus on incomplete information of political games.
Roemer (2001) shows that in a unidimensional Wittmanian electoral model,
i.e., a political game with a unidimensional policy space in which parties are
motivated to realize their ideal policies, introduction of parties’ incomplete in-
formation on the side of parties about the distribution of voters’ types generates
an equilibrium with differentiated policies. Contrary to his hypothesis of vot-
ers’ informational advantage over parties, we assume parties’ advantage. The
previous example of elections over redistributive policy illustrates a typical sit-
uation where our assumption ﬁts. Furthermore, whereas parties’ uncertainty in
Roemer’s model plays a subordinate role complementing the Wittmanian hy-
pothesis, in our Downsian model, incomplete information for voters is the sole
factor causing policy divergence.
Banks (1990, 1991) models voters’ incomplete information about the can-
didates’ true types, where a type of a candidate represents a policy that he will
implement if elected. He shows that, if there exists a cost for each candidate
which is increasing in the distance between his true type and his platform, then
an equilibrium possesses some interval of types where the strategy is separat-
ing. A more recent work by Kartik and McAfee (2007) constructs a model with
“character” of candidates. Each candidate either has the character or not; if he
does, he commits to a platform, and if not, he strategically chooses a policy.
A unique mixed equilibrium strategy of strategic candidates is explicitly con-
structed, and hence the equilibrium is symmetric, but different from that in the
conclusion of MVT. The models in these studies share with ours the basic in-
formation structure in which candidates are advantageous. However, they both
impose some additional assumption on candidates’ action ex post or after elec-
tion, while we have no such assumption. Also, an asymmetric equilibrium does
not arise, or at least is not proved to exist, in either model, whereas it exists in
our model and one such equilibrium is even strictly perfect.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we model political compe-
tition as a dynamic incomplete information game. Section 3 studies the weakly
perfect Bayesian equilibria of incomplete infomation political games describ-
ingtheconditionsrequiredforvoters’beliefswhichsupporttheequilibria. Sec-
4tion 4 contrasts this equilibrium result with the complete information version
of our political games. In Section 5, we examine the Nash equilibrium in per-
turbed games discussing the dependence of existence of equilibria on parties’
error probability. Based on the observation obtained in Section 5, Sections
6 and 7 studies the perfect equilibrium and the strictly perfect equilibrium in
incomplete information political games. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, we construct a model of political competition. The model is de-
ﬁned as a dynamic game with incomplete information consisting of two parties
and a continuum of voters in which the parties have informational advantage
over voters.
We consider a society consisting of two political parties, I 2 fA;Bg, and
voters whose population is normalized to 1. There are two possible policies,
k2K =f0;1g. Weassumethatthereisavariablex2X =[0;1]whichdescribes
“fundamentals” affecting the relative effectiveness of these policies. After the
parties announce their policies, a majority voting determines one party as the
winner. The winning party then carries out its platform.
Each individual’s utility decreases (monotonically, in the weak sense) in the
variable x, and his threshold for x is represented by his type. Speciﬁcally, each
voter belongs to a type d 2 D = [0;1] distributed according to a distribution
function F with median ¯ d. His utility depends on the executed policy k, the
variable x, and his type d. For each type d, we deﬁne the utility function
wd : K£X ! R of a type d voter by
wd(k;x) = (d ¡x)k:
According to this deﬁnition, if the value of economic fundamentals is x, a voter
of type d prefers policy 1 if d >x, prefers policy 0 if d <x. Before the election,
voters cannot observe the value of x. We model this uncertainty by a random
variable q with mean m. Only the parties can observe the realized value of q.
Let us provide some examples for the fundamentals variable x and individ-
uals’ utility functions. Suppose that there are two different rates of uniform
income tax as the policy alternatives in a society: policy 1 represents the larger
rate and policy 0 the smaller. The tax revenue will be transfered among voters.
Suppose further that voters make decisions on their labor and consumption af-
ter the determination of tax policy. Thus adopting policy 1 will decrease the
aggregate product in the economy compared with when policy 0 is adopted.
Let x be an index of this decrease in the aggregate product which takes values
5in [0;1]. Each voter has a threshold d of the variable x so that he prefers policy
1 if and only if x < d. 1 However, voters are unfamiliar with the information
about x and hence they only know the prior probability distribution, whereas
the parties A and B know the extent to which levying the higher tax imposes a
loss in the economy, perhaps through their research activities.
As another example, consider a country J facing a diplomatic problem with
a foreign country N. There is a suspicion against country N of possessing
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The probability that N has WMD is x.
For citizens in country J, how likely this occurs is ambiguous, and thus they
only know the prior probability distribution of x. Now, the country must take
either a “hard-line” stance (policy 0) or a “soft-line” stance (policy 1) against
country N. Thus every voter has a point d such that as long as x<d, he support
the soft-line policy.
We assume the following conditions on the distribution functions of d and
q.
Assumption 1.
(i) Distribution function P : X ! [0;1] is continuous and strictly increasing.
(ii) Distribution function F : D ! [0;1] is continuous and strictly increasing.
Under Assumption 1, 0 < ¯ d;m < 1.
The timing of events is as follows: ﬁrst, the parties observe the value x
of economic fundamentals; second, the parties simultaneously announce their
platforms; third, voters observe the announced policy pair; fourth, voters vote
for the party with their preferred policy; and ﬁnally, the winning party carries
out its policy. The parties thus can condition their decisions on the observed
value x of q. Voters, on the other hand, can condition their choices on the pair
of announced platforms (kA;kB).







For each policy k, sk(x) represents the probability that party takes policy k con-
ditional on q = x. We assume that sk : X ! [0;1] is Lebesgue measurable,
k = 0;1. Denote by S the set of all strategies of a party:
S =
©
s = (s0;s1) : X ! ˜ Kjsk is measurable, k = 0;1
ª
:
1The types d of voters in this example should be derived from their primitive data such as their utility
functions or labor skills. This is true in general cases where we want to apply the model. However, through
this paper, we assume that the distribution of d in the population is given and known to the parties. We
can imagine, for example, that given a political issue, the quantitative data of public opinion on this issue is
provided by public or private surveys.







(tA(kA;kB);tB(kA;kB)). For each party I 2fA;Bg,tI(kA;kB) represents the prob-
ability that the voter votes for party I after observing the pair of policy an-
nouncements (kA;kB). We assume that if the two parties announce the same
policy, then he votes for each party with probability one half. Denote by T the
set of all strategies of a voter:
T =
©




A proﬁle of voting probabilities of the citizens, i.e., a family (qd)d2D 2
Õd2D ˜ fA;Bg, 2 completely determines the probability of electoral outcomes.




for the winning probability of party I.













UI(sA;sB;(td)d2D;x) represents the expected utility of party I given the strategy
proﬁle (sA;sB;(td)d2D) conditional on q = x.







Ud(sA;sB;td;x) then represents the expected utility of a type d citizen given the
strategy proﬁle (sA;sB;td) conditional on q = x.
Political competition in this society can be modeled by a dynamic game
with incomplete information as follows.






where S is the set of strategies of a party, T is the set of strategies of a voter,
UI is the conditional payoff function of party I, Ud is the conditional payoff
function of a type d voter, F is the distribution function of citizens’ types, P
is the distribution function of q, and L denotes the speciﬁc order of play and
information structure: (i) the parties observes the value of q and then simulta-
neously announce policies, and (ii) every voter cannot observe the value of q,
but observes the announced policies and then votes for a party.
2This notation implicitly assumes that all citizens of one type take the same action. Moreover, we will
denote a strategy proﬁle as (td)d 2 D. In our setting, this causes no problem.
73 Nash equilibrium and beliefs of voters
In this section, we deﬁne the Nash equilibrium and the weakly perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of an incomplete information political game. We then study the
weakly perfect Bayesian equilibrium, paying attention to the relation between
voters’ beliefs on fundamentals and the parties’ strategies. From the result
obtained from this analysis, we derive a corollary on the Nash equilibria in
terms of a newly-introduced function Q, which is more explicit in the locations
of switching points of equilibrium strategies.
The Nash equilibrium in an incomplete information political game is de-
ﬁned as follows.





































d)d2D) is a Nash equilibrium in G for some strategy proﬁle of
the voters (t¤
d)d2D, we often simply say that (s¤
A;s¤
B) is a Nash equilibrium.
Using the speciﬁc information structure, L, of our political games, the
above deﬁnition can be equivalently stated as follows.


























































8The condition (iii) of Deﬁnition 3 clariﬁes that the notion of Nash equi-
librium imposes no requirement on actions of the voters in out-of-equilibrium
paths. Weakly perfect Bayesian equilibrium deﬁned below requires that every
voter’s action at unreached moves be rational with respect to some “belief”
about the conditional distribution of q.
Deﬁnition 4. Let G be a political game.
(i) A belief of a voter is a family of probability measures on X, b =
(bkA;kB)(kA;kB)2K£K.
(ii) A belief b is consistent with a strategy pair (sA;sB) of the parties if for
every policy pair (kA;kB) such that
R
sA;kA(x)sB;kB(x)dP(x) > 0 and for







The right hand side of (1) is exactly the conditional probability that q 2Y
given that the announced policy pair is (kA;kB) derived from the strategy pair
(sA;sB). For any strategy pair (sA;sB) and any policy pair (kA;kB) reached
with positive probability by (sA;sB), write EsA;sB(qjkA;kB) for the conditional











d)d2D) is a weakly perfect Bayesian equilibrium in G if
(i) it satisﬁes the conditions (i) and (ii) of Deﬁnition 3, and
(ii) for every voter, there exists a belief b = (bkA;kB)(kA;kB)2K£K consistent
with (s¤
A;s¤












The condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 5 requires that every voter’s strategy be opti-
mal conditional on any announced policy pair with some belief on q consistent
with the parties’ strategies.
9We proceed to derive the optimality condition of a voter’s strategy given the
parties’ strategies, based on a belief consistent with them. For ease of notation,




Given a strategy pair of the parties (sA;sB) and a belief b consistent with
(sA;sB), if a type d citizen observes the pair of announced policies (1,0), then
he should vote for party A, i.e., his strategy should give td(1;0) = (1;0), if
d > Eb(1;0). More generally, the optimal strategy of a type d voter, t¤
d, given
the parties’ strategy pair (sA;sB) and the voter’s belief b consistent with it, must




(1;0) if Eb(1;0) < d




(1;0) if Eb(0;1) > d






2 by our deﬁnition of the strategy set T.
We will concentrate on weakly perfect equilibria supported by an identical
belief among voters. This may be justiﬁed since if we require some trembling
hand stability of equilibria, then any stable equilibrium must be supported by
such a common beilief of the voters as we will see in later sections.
From (3), given a pair of the parties’ strategies (sA;sB) 2 S£S and a com-
mon belief b of the voters consistent with (sA;sB), the fraction of citizens vot-
ing for party A having observed the pair of announced policies (1,0) is equal
to 1¡F(Eb(1;0)). Noting the strict monotonicity of F in Assumption 1, the
fraction of citizens voting for party A in this situation is therefore greater than
or equal to one half if and only if Eb(1;0) · ¯ d. We assume that if the voting
results in a tie, each party’s winning probability is one half. Thus, the victory
probability of the parties in an election when (t¤
d)d2D is a proﬁle of voters’










1 if Eb(1;0) < ¯ d
1
2 if Eb(1;0) = ¯ d











1 if Eb(0;1) > ¯ d
1
2 if Eb(0;1) = ¯ d














10pR is deﬁned by pR = 1¡pL.
We will restrict our attention to those Nash equilibria in which each party
takes a “cut-off strategy” deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 6. The cut-off strategy of a party switching around x0 2 X, denoted
by [x0], is a strategy deﬁned by
[x0](x) =
(
(1;0) if x · x0
(0;1) if x > x0:
The following proposition speciﬁes the set of all cut-off weakly perfect
Bayesian equilibria of a political game in terms of the positions of switching
points of the parties’ strategies and the conditions on voters’ beliefs consistent
with those equilibria. The conditions are stated only for the strategy pairs with
x¤
A ¸ x¤
B. This is a sufﬁcient way of description due to our symmetric modeling
of the two parties: if ([x¤
A];[x¤
B]) is an equilibrium for some equilibrium concept,
then ([x¤
B];[x¤
A]) is also an equilibrium.





completeinformation politicalgame, wherethemedian ofthe distributionfunc-





B is a weakly perfect Bayesian equilibrium supported by
a common belief b of the voters consistent with ([x¤
A];[x¤
B]) if and only if one of
the following conditions is satisﬁed.
(i) 0 < x¤
B · x¤
A < 1 and Eb(1;0) = Eb(0;1) = ¯ d.
(ii) m > ¯ d, 0 = x¤
B < x¤
A < 1, Eb(1;0) = ¯ d, and Eb(0;1) ¸ ¯ d.
(iii) m = ¯ d, x¤
B = 0, x¤
A = 1, and Eb(1;0) = ¯ d.
(iv) m < ¯ d, 0 < x¤
B < x¤
A = 1, Eb(1;0) = ¯ d, and Eb(0;1) · ¯ d.
(v) x¤
A = x¤
B = 0, Eb(1;0) ¸ ¯ d, and Eb(0;1) ¸ ¯ d.
(vi) x¤
A = x¤
B = 1, Eb(1;0) · ¯ d, and Eb(0;1) · ¯ d.
Proof. Condition (i). Suppose that 0 < x¤
B · x¤
A < 1. By the assumption of
monotonicity of P (the condition (i) of Assumption 1), this occurs if and only
if both policy pairs (1;1) and (0;0) are announced with positive probability.
By the formula (3), party A has no incentive to deviate from (1;1) if and only
if Eb(0;1) · ¯ d. Similarly, party B has no incentive to deviate from (1;1) if
11and only if Eb(1;0) · ¯ d. By the same reasoning, both parties cannot proﬁtably
deviate from the policy pair (0;0) if and only if Eb(0;1) ¸ ¯ d and Eb(1;0) ¸ ¯ d.
Thus, ([x¤
A];[x¤
B]) is a weakly perfect Bayesian equilibrium with common belief
b if and only if Eb(1;0) = Eb(0;1) = ¯ d.
Conditions (ii) and (iii). Suppose that 0=x¤
B <x¤
A <1. This is equivalent to
that the policy pairs (1;0) and (0;0) are announced with positive probabilities.
Similar argument as in the preceding paragraph concludes that ([x¤
A];[x¤
B]) is
a weakly perfect Bayesian equilibrium with common belief b if and only if
Eb(1;0) = ¯ d and Eb(0;1) ¸ ¯ d. But, by consistency of b,
Eb(1;0) = E(qj0 < q · x¤
A) < m;
where the inequality follows again from (i) of Assumption 1. Hence, m > ¯ d.
The part (ii)-(vii) can be similarly veriﬁed.
Conditions (v) and (vi). Suppose x¤
A = x¤
B = 0. This is equivalent to that
only the policy pair (0;0) is announced with positive probability. Proﬁtable
deviation from (0;0) by either party is impossible if and only if Eb(qj1;0) ¸ ¯ d
and Eb(qj0;1) ¸ ¯ d. The part (ix) can be similarly proved.
Since all possible locations of (x¤
A;x¤
B) have been checked, the proof is com-
plete.
Proposition 1 relates equilibrium strategy proﬁles of the parties to the con-
ditional “expectations” of the voters with respect to their beliefs which support
those strategy proﬁles. A remarkable feature is that any “interior” strategy pro-
ﬁle of the parties, i.e., a strategy pair with switching points in the interior of
X, is a weakly perfect Bayesian equilibrium if and only if it is supported by a
common belief of the voters such that both conditional expectations of q given
policy pairs (1;0) and (0;1) are equal to the median type, while for “corner”
strategy pairs, the corresponding conditions contain at most one equation for
the two expectations.
For an interior strategy pair of the parties to be a weakly perfect Bayesian











, must be equal to one half because oth-
erwise, either party can improve its expected payoff by deviating from the pol-
icy pair (0;0) or (1;1). With any corner strategy proﬁle, one of these two pairs
of convergent policy announcements does not occur, and hence the winning
probability given this policy pair does not have to be exactly one-half. The dif-
ference in the equilibrium conditions in Proposition 1 reﬂects these facts and
will be important in studying equilibrium reﬁnement in later sections.
Proposition 1 can be restated in a form which is more explicit on the po-
sitions of equilibrium strategies by ignoring the constraints for the beliefs on
12out-of-equilibrium actions. To do this, we ﬁrst deﬁne a function Q as follows.





The value Q(x;d) represents the bias of q from the type d in terms of the
distribution function P on the interval [0;x]. It serves as a measure of the dis-
tance between point x and type d, but more detailed property of Q as a function
depends on the property of distribution function P.
The properties of function Q described in the following lemma is derived
directly from its deﬁnition.
Lemma 1. For the function Q deﬁned in Deﬁnition 7, the following statements
hold under (i) of Assumption 1.
(i) For each voter type d, the function Q(¢;d) is continuous, decreasing on
[0;d], increasing on [d;1], and takes values Q(0;d)=0, Q(1;d)= m¡d.
(ii) If xI;xJ 2 X and xI < xJ, then E(qjxI < q · xJ) is greater than, equal
to, less than d as Q(xJ;d) is greater than, equal to, less than Q(xI;d),
respectively.
The graph of Q(¢; ¯ d) in a typical incomplete information political game in
which m > ¯ d is illustrated in Figure 1.
If the parties select different cut-off points, a pair of different policies are
announced with positive probability. The preference relation of a type-d voter
between the two policies is then equivalently described by the relation between
the values of the Q(¢;d) at these switching points: the policy of the party with
smaller Q value is preferred by him. Each of distinct policies thus yields one
half of the total votes if and only if the values of the function Q(¢; ¯ d) at these
cut-off points are equal. Due to the strict concavity of the function Q(¢; ¯ d)
stated in (i) of Lemma 1, there are at most two distinct points at which the
values of Q(¢; ¯ d) are equal such as x¤
A and x¤
B in Figure 1.
By (i) of Lemma 1 and the fact that 0 < ¯ d < 1 implied by Assumption 1,
eachofthe twopoints deﬁnedin thefollowingdeﬁnitionuniquely exists. These
points determine the intervals in X where a point can always ﬁnd a different
point with equal value of Q(¢; ¯ d).
Deﬁnition 8. Points ´ x and ` x. Under Assumption 1, if m ¸ ¯ d, we denote by ´ x
a unique point in the interval (0;1] such that Q(x; ¯ d) = 0. If m · ¯ d, we denote
by ` x a unique point in the interval [0;1) such that Q(x; ¯ d) = m ¡ ¯ d.





Figure 1: The function Q(¢; ¯ d)
According to this deﬁnition, it is clear that the only strategy pair satisfying
the condition (ii) of Proposition 1 is ([´ x];[0]) and that the only strategy pair
satisfying (iv) of the proposition is ([1];[` x]).
With these observations in hand, we translate Proposition 1 on weakly per-
fect Bayesian equilibria into the following corollary in terms of function Q on
Nash equilibria, which, as a set of the parties’ strategy proﬁles, coincide with
weakly perfect Bayesian equilibria.
Corollary 1. Let G be an incomplete information political game. Then, under
Assumption 1, a cut-off strategy pair ([x¤
A];[x¤
B]) such that x¤
A ¸ x¤
B is a Nash
equilibrium of G if and only if one of the following condition is satisﬁed.
(i) m ¸ ¯ d, 0 < x¤
B < x¤
A < ´ x, and Q(x¤
A; ¯ d) = Q(x¤
B; ¯ d);
(ii) m ¸ ¯ d, x¤
B = 0 and x¤
A = ´ x;
(iii) m · ¯ d, ` x < x¤
B < x¤
A < 1, and Q(x¤
A; ¯ d) = Q(x¤
B; ¯ d);
(iv) m · ¯ d, x¤







B]) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
Q(x¤
A; ¯ d) = Q(x¤
B; ¯ d): (6)
Corollary 1 suggests that the set of pairs of Nash equilibrium cut-off points,
(x¤
A;x¤
B), is geometrically expressed as the union of two crossing curves in the
unit square. Suppose, for example, m > ¯ d. When Assumption 1 holds, by strict
concavity of function Q(¢; ¯ d), the set of points (x¤
A;x¤
B) satisfying (i) or (ii) is
(if the point (¯ d; ¯ d) is added) represented by a curve in the unit square region





Figure 2: The Nash equilibrium switching point pairs (x¤
L;x¤
R) in Example 1
has interceptions with the sides of the square ´ x or ` x, and passes through (¯ d; ¯ d).
The points satisfying (v) constitute the 45-degree line in the unit square. These
two parts constitute the set of pairs of Nash equilibrium cut-off points.
Example 1. Let G be a political game in which q is uniformly distributed on
the unit interval, that is, P(x) = x for all x 2 X. Moreover, assume that F is
such that ¯ d < 1
2 = m. In this game, the function Q(¢; ¯ d) is given by
Q(x; ¯ d) = x2
2 ¡ ¯ dx
for each x 2 X. Therefore, by Corollary 1, the set of pairs of Nash equilibrium





2 ¡ ¯ dxA =
x2
B
2 ¡ ¯ dxB; 0 · xA;xB · 1
ª
:
This set is illustrated in Figure 2.
4 Comparison with complete information case
In this section, We brieﬂy deviate from our main assumption of incomplete
information, and check the fact that if we instead suppose the complete infor-
mation, then the present model’s version of Median Voter Theorem holds true.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the complete information version of a political game as fol-
lows.





where L0 differs from L only in that the voters, as well as the parties, now can
observe the value of q, and the set of strategies of a voter is
T0 =
©
t : K£K£X ! ˜ fA;Bgjt(1;1;x) = t(0;0;x) = 1
2 for all x 2 X
ª
:
15The Nash equilibrium and the subgame perfect equilibrium in a complete
information political game are deﬁned in a standard way, and hence we omit
the formal deﬁnition of these concepts.
We obtain the following results on Nash equilibria and subgame perfect
equilibria in complete information political games.
Proposition 2. Let G0 be a complete information political game. Then,
(i) a proﬁle (s¤
A;s¤
B) of pure strategies is a Nash equilibrium of G0 if and only
if s¤
A(x) = s¤
B(x) for almost every x with respect to P, and
(ii) a strategy proﬁle (s¤
A;s¤
B) is a subgame perfect equilibrium in G0 if and




(1;0) if x < ¯ d




B(x) for almost every x, then it is optimal for every voter to
set for every x,
t¤(1;0;x) = t¤(0;1;x) = (1
2; 1
2)
since the policy pairs (1;0) and (0;1) are reached with probability zero. Such
(s¤
A;s¤
B) are thus all Nash equilibria of G0. If s¤
A(q) 6= s¤
B(q) with positive
probability, then by our assumption that P is strictly increasing, the event that
s¤
A(q) 6= s¤
B(q) and q 6= ¯ d has positive probability, and hence a party loses with
positive probability. This proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition.
A strategy proﬁle of voters, (t¤
d)d2D, consists in a subgame perfect equilib-




(1;0) if x < d




(1;0) if x > d
(0;1) if x < d
:
This proves the last part of the proposition.
The statement (ii) of the proposition is the version of Median Voter Theo-
rem in our political game. It says that, given a value x of fundamentals, both
parties will choose the ideal policy of voters who have the median type under
the state x: policy 1 if x < ¯ d, and policy 0 if x > ¯ d. The subgame perfect equi-
librium corresponds to the notion of political equilibrium in standard electoral
models. The reason for the indeterminancy of Nash equilibria appearing in the
16statement (i) of the proposition is that, the deﬁnition of the Nash equilibrium in
the present model allows arbitrariness of voters’ actions off equilibrium.
Restricting these results to pairs of cut-off strategies, the following corol-
lary may be more appropriate in comparison with the results for incomplete
information games.
Corollary 2. Let G0 be a complete information political game.
(i) Then, a cut-off strategy proﬁle of the parties ([x¤
A];[x¤
B]) is a Nash equilib-
rium of G0 if and only if x¤
A = x¤
B, and
(ii) the unique cut-off subgame perfect equilibrium is ([¯ d];[¯ d]).
By the statement (i) of Corollary 1 and the statement (i) of Corollary 2, the
set of cut-off Nash equilibria in a complete information political game G0 is
a proper subset of that in the corresponding incomplete information political
game G. Speciﬁcally, in any cut-off Nash equilibrium of G0, the policies of the
two parties coincide at every observed value of q. Moreover, by Proposition 2,
even if we allow the whole class of strategies of a party, the equilibrium policy
convergence essentially remains true. In contrast, in a complete information
game G, there are Nash equilibria in which policy divergence occurs with pos-
itive probability, i.e., the strategy proﬁles satisfying the conditions (i) and (ii)
of Corollary 1.
By (ii) of Proposition 2, in a subgame perfect equilibrium of a complete
information political game G0, policy divergence is possible only at the parties’
observation q = ¯ d. This is because given that q = ¯ d, the voters are divided
into two groups prefering different policies. By looking at the conditions (i)-
(iv) of Corollary 1, we understand that unobservabability of q by the voters in
a political game expands the possibility of policy divergence from the point ¯ d
in X to the various intervals keeping the conditional expectations of q ﬁxed at
¯ d.
We recognize, however, that there is still a difﬁculty in interpreting this
result because of the considerable multiplicity: there is a continuum of Nash
equilibria in an incomplete information political game. Natural questions arise
at this point: Can we reﬁne the equilibria by some stability criterion? If so,
which strategy pairs stated in Corollary 1 are stable? The following sections
will study these problems.
175 Perturbed games
Astheﬁrststepforequilibriumreﬁnement, inthissectionweanalyzeperturbed
games of incomplete information political games. We show the existence and
important properties of the “critical type” of voters in a perturbed game, which
plays essentially the same role as the median type in a non-perturbed game.
Then we study the Nash equilibria in a perturbed game.
We deﬁne a perturbation in an incomplete information political game as
follows.
Deﬁnition 10. Deﬁne G =
©
h : D ! (0; 1
2)jh is continuous
ª
and E = (0; 1
2).
A perturbation of an incomplete information political game is a triple r =
(eA;eB;g) 2 E £E £G.
Then a perturbed game is deﬁned as follows.





and a perturbation r = (eA;eB;g), a per-
turbed game of G with r is a political game
ˆ G(r) =









where for each party I,
ˆ S(eI) =
©
sI 2 SjsI(x) 2 [eI;1¡eI]£[eI;1¡eI] for all x 2 X
ª
;
for each voter type d,
ˆ T(g(d)) =
©
t 2 Tjt(kA;kB) 2 [g(d);1¡g(d)]£[g(d);1¡g(d)] for all (kA;kB) 2 K£K
ª
;
for each party I, ˆ U
r
I is the restriction of function UI to ˆ S(eA) £ ˆ S(eB) £
Õd2D ˆ T(g(d)); and for each voter type d, ˆ U
r
d is the restriction ofUd to ˆ S(eA)£
ˆ S(eB)£ ˆ T(g(d)).
Theanalogueofcut-offstrategyinapoliticalgameinDeﬁnition6isdeﬁned
as follows.
Deﬁnition 12. A cut-off strategy switching around x0 2 X of a party I in a




(1¡eI;eI) if x · x0
(eI;1¡eI) if x > x0
:
18The Nash equilibrium of a perturbed game can be deﬁned in the same way
as in Deﬁnition 2 except that the original strategy sets of players are now re-
placed by those deﬁned in Deﬁnition 11.
Recall the notation EsA;sB(qjkA;kB) in (2) for the conditional expectation of
q given that the announced policy pair is (kA;kB) derived from strategy pair
(sA;sB). In any perturbed game ˆ G(r), this is deﬁned for all policy pairs (kA;kB)
since they are reached with positive probability, i.e., the denominator of the
right-hand side of (2) is positive for all (kA;kB). Let (sA;sB) = ([xA]eA;[xB]eB)





















the parties’ strategy pair is therefore completely connected to the strategies of
the parties in a perturbed game ˆ G(r) as follows: In a perturbed game ˆ G(r),
given a strategy proﬁle of the parties (sA;sB) 2 ˆ S(eA)£ ˆ S(eB), a strategy t¤
d 2




(1;0) if EsA;sB(qj1;0) < d





(1;0) if EsA;sB(qj0;1) > d







Now, let ˆ G(r) be a perturbed game with perturbation r = (eA;eB;g), and





Deﬁne also a function l : D ! [0;1] by
lg(d) = [1¡F(d)]¡[G(1)¡G(d)]+G(d): (10)
Suppose for a moment that the voters observed the value q = d. By (8), the
ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of (10) is then equal to the fraction of voters
voting for the party announcing policy 1 over the party announcing policy 0
19as in the original game G. The second term is the fraction of voters voting for
the party with policy 0, though belonging to types prefering policy 1, which
arises as the accumulated mistakes in the population due to the perturbation.
The last term is the fraction of voters voting for the party with policy 1, though
belonging to types prefering policy 0. Therefore, lg(d) is the fraction of the
voters who vote for the party with policy 1 against the party with policy 0,
given that q = d.
Using this function, we deﬁne the notion of critical type in a perturbed
game, which plays the same role as the median type ¯ d in a non-perturbed game.
Deﬁnition 13. Let ˆ G(r) be a perturbed game with perturbation r = (eA;eB;g).
A voter type ˆ d(g) is called the critical type of ˆ G(r) if
(i) the function lg is strictly decreasing on D, and
(ii) lg(ˆ d(g)) = 1
2.
We then have the following lemma for the properties of the critical type of
a perturbed game.
Lemma 2. Let G be an incomplete information political game.
(i) Let ˆ G(r) be a perturbed game of G with perturbation r = (eA;eB;g).
Then, there exists the critical type ˆ d(g) of ˆ G(r) if g(d) is sufﬁciently
small for all d.
(ii) If (gn)¥
n=1 is a sequence of the voters’ perturbations converging to the
constantly 0-valued function such that ˆ d(gn) exists for every n, then
limn!¥ ˆ d(gn) = ¯ d.
(iii) There exist sequences (gn
i )¥
n=1, i = 1;2;3, of the voters’ perturbations,
each of which converges to 0 as n ! ¥, such that ˆ d(gn
1) < ¯ d = ˆ d(gn
2) <
ˆ d(gn
3) for every n.
Proof. See Appendix.
The statement (i) in Lemma 2 guarantees the existence of the critical types
in perturbed games in which voters’ perturbations are small enough. This fact
allows us to study stability of Nash equilibria in non-perturbed games by com-
paring the conditional expectations of q and the critical types in slightly per-
turbed games. Moreover, by the statement (ii), the critical type in a perturbed
game converges to the median type in the original game as voters’ perturba-
tions go to zero. The statement (iii) says that the direction of the convergence
20of critical types to the median type depends on the manner of convergence of
voters’ perturbations. This fact will be important particularly in considering
the strictly perfect equilibrium where we have to take into account all types of
perturbations which converge to zero.
Let G(r) be a perturbed game with r = (eA;eB;g), where the voters’ per-
turbation g is close enough to 0 so that the critical type ˆ d(g) exists by Lemma
2. By Deﬁnition 13 of the critical type and the condition (8) for the vot-
ers’ optimal strategies, we then obtain the following formula for the winning
probability of the parties in the perturbed game, which is analogous to (3):
If (t¤
d)d2D 2 Õd2D ˆ T(g(d)) is a proﬁle of voters’ optimal strategies in the per-











1 if EsA;sB(qj1;0) < ˆ d(g)
1
2 if EsA;sB(qj1;0) = ˆ d(g)











1 if EsA;sB(qj0;1) > ˆ d(g)
1
2 if EsA;sB(qj0;1) = ˆ d(g)














As the following proposition will show, the necessary and sufﬁcient con-
ditions for Nash equilibrium in a perturbed game is almost the same as the
conditions of the weakly perfect Bayesian equilibria described in Proposition
1. However, since all policy pairs are reached with positive probability in a
perturbed game, the conditions are now completely based on the strategies of
the parties.
Proposition 3. Let ˆ G(r) be a perturbed game with perturbation r =(eA;eB;g)
and assume that g is close enough to 0 so that the critical type ˆ d(g) exists.
Then, a pair of the parties’ cut-off strategies (sA;sB) = ([xA]eA;[xB]eB) in G(r)
such that xA ¸ xB is a Nash equilibrium of G(r) if and only if one of the follow-
ing conditions is satisﬁed.
(i) 0 < xB · xA < 1 and EsA;sB(qj1;0) = EsA;sB(qj0;1) = ˆ d(g).
(ii) m > ˆ d(g), 0 = xB < xA < 1,
EsA;sB(qj1;0) = ˆ d(g), and EsA;sB(qj0;1) ¸ ˆ d(g).
(iii) m = ˆ d(g), and (xA;xB) = (0;0) or (xA;xB) = (1;0) or (xA;xB) = (1;1).
21(iv) m < ˆ d(g), 0 < xB < xA = 1,
EsA;sB(qj1;0) = ˆ d(g), and EsA;sB(qj0;1) · ˆ d(g).
The conditional expectations EsA;sB(qj1;0) and EsA;sB(qj0;1) is given by (7).
Proof. Conditions (i), (ii), and (iv). The gain or the loss for a party I from
deviating from an equilibrium probability pair (sA(x);sB(x)) to the “opposite”
strategy, for example, party A deviating from (eA;eB) to (1¡eA;eB), is always
eI less than the corresponding deviation without error in the original game G.
Thus, this does not alter the essential argument for possibility of a party’s devi-
ation in the proof of Proposition 1, except that now the median type ¯ d must be
replaced with the critical type ˆ d(g) and a belief-based expectation Eb(kA;kB)
with the strategy-based expectation EsA;sB(qjkA;kB), by (11).
Condition (iii). With any of the three strategy pairs in the condition (iii) of
the proposition, the conditional expectations given policy pairs (1,0) and (0,1)
are equal to m. Thus, it is a Nash equilibrium if and only if m = ˆ d(g).
Proposition 3 can be restated as the following corollary in terms of the func-
tion Q which is more explicit in the locations of equilibrium cut-off points, as
in Section 3 where Proposition 1 on the weakly perfect Bayesian equilibria in
non-perturbed games was translated into Corollary 1.







£D to R and functions ˜ j and ˜ y from E £D to R by, given mean m of q,
j(eA;eB;d) =
[(eA)2(1¡eB)+(1¡eA)2eB](m¡d)
(eB¡eA)(1¡2eA) ; y(eA;eB;d) =
eB(1¡eB)(m¡d)
(eB¡eA)(1¡2eB);
˜ j(e;d) = ¡
e(m¡d)




Corollary 3. Let ˆ G(r) be a perturbed game with perturbation r = (eA;eB;g)
and assume that g is close enough to 0 so that the critical type ˆ d(g) exists.
Then, a pair of the parties’ cut-off strategies (sA;sB) = ([xA]eA;[xB]eB) in G(r)
such that xA ¸ xB is a Nash equilibrium of G(r) if and only if one of the follow-
ing conditions is satisﬁed.
(i) m > ˆ d(g), eB < eA, 0 < xB < xA < 1, xB < ˆ d(g),
Q(xA; ˆ d(g)) = j(eA;eB; ˆ d(g)), and Q(xB; ˆ d(g)) = y(eA;eB; ˆ d(g)).
(ii) m > ˆ d(g), 0 = xB < xA < 1, and Q(xA; ˆ d(g)) = ˜ j(eA; ˆ d(g)).
(iii) m = ˆ d(g), and (xA;xB) = (0;0) or (xA;xB) = (1;0) or (xA;xB) = (1;1).
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Figure 3: Nash equilibria in perturbed games
(v) m < ˆ d(g), eA < eB, 0 < xB < xA < 1, xA > ˆ d(g),
Q(xA; ˆ d(g)) = j(eA;eB; ˆ d(g)), and Q(xB; ˆ d(g)) = y(eA;eB; ˆ d(g)).
(vi) m < ˆ d(g), 0 < xB < xA = 1, and Q(xB; ˆ d(g)) = ˜ y(eB; ˆ d(g)).
Proof. See Appendix.
Based on Corollary 3, we can outline the set of Nash equilibria of a per-
turbedgameintermsofcut-offpointpairsasinFigure3inwhichthegraphsare
illustrated for cases of a uniform q, where the dashed lines represent the set of
Nash equilibria in the original game. For example, consider a perturbed game
in which m > ˆ d(g) and eA > eB. There are at most two pairs of cut-off points
satisfying the condition (i) of the corollary such as (xA;xB) and (x0
A;xB) in the
left-hand graph of Figure 6 in Appendix. Note that, by symmetry between the
parties, the corollary implies that there exists no interior Nash equilibrium at
which party B’s switching point is greater than or equal to party A’s. Also,
23there are at most two pairs of cut-off points satisfying the condition (ii) such as
(yA;0) and (y0
A;0) in the left-hand graph of Figure 7. But, since this condition
imposes no requirement on the relation between eA and eB, cut-off pairs such as
(0;zB) and (0;z0
B), where zB and z0
B are the two points whose values of function
Q(¢; ˆ d(g)) are equal to ˜ j(eB; ˆ d(g)), are also equilibrium pairs of cut-off points.
Therefore, there exist at most six Nash equilibria in this perturbed game, whose
cut-off point pairs are illustrated as x1;¢¢¢ ;x6 in the left-top square of Figure
3. The relation between the rest of Figure 3 and Corollary 3 can be similarly
explained.
As shown in Figure 3, Corollary 3 suggests that, for any interior Nash equi-
librium (s¤
A;s¤
B) in a non-perturbed game, in which parties are more likely to
announce the ex ante popular policy in this game (i.e., policy 0 if m > ¯ d, and
policy 1 if m < ¯ d), there exists some slight perturbation that possesses an in-
terior Nash equilibrium near (s¤
A;s¤
B) like the strategy pair with cut-off point
pair x1 or x2 in Figure 3. It also suggests that near each of the corner Nash
equilibria in the original game, there always exists a corner Nash equilibrium
in any slightly perturbed game like the strategy pairs with cut-off point pairs
x3;¢¢¢ ;x6. We derive these conjectural claims from the fact that, by (iii) of
Lemma 2, the relation between the prior mean of fundamentals m and the me-
dian type ¯ d in a political game implies the same relation between m and the
critical type ˆ d(g) in any slightly perturbed game, while either relation between
eA and eB can happen given only that the perturbations are small.
In particular, there exists no interior Nash equilibrium in a perturbed game
in which the party with smaller perturbation is more likely to choose the ex
ante unpopular policy in the perturbed game. This simply reﬂects that a pary
can be less populist in an equilibrium as long as it is publicly believed to make
more mistakes.
6 Perfect equilibrium
In the preceding section, we have analyzed the Nash equilibria of perturbed
games. Using those results, we now proceed to examine the stability of Nash
equilibria of incomplete information political games. In this section, we study
the perfect equilibrium of Selten (1975).
We deﬁne the perfect equilibrium of a political game as follows.




I] is a cut-off
strategy for each party I, is a perfect equilibrium in a political game G if there






24(0;0;0), 3 and a number N such that there exists a sequence of strategy pro-






d)d2D)n¸N, satisfying the following conditions:















Remark . A perfect equilibrium by this deﬁnition is always a perfect equilib-
rium by the original deﬁnition of Selten (1975), except that our political games
are not ﬁnite, but the converse may not hold because our deﬁnition involves the
requirement that Nash equilibrium strategies of parties in perturbed games be
cut-off strategies.
As the following proposition will state, if m > ¯ d (m < ¯ d), the perfect equi-
librium only excludes Nash equilibria such that both parties choose the same
cut-off point larger (smaller) than the median type. Proving that these Nash
equilibria are not perfect equilibria is easy: recall that in the previous section
we have seen that there is no Nash equilibrium with both parties switching at
points larger (smaller) than the critical type in a perturbed game with m > ˆ d(g)
(m < ˆ d(g)). Note also that the critical type ˆ d(g) converges to the median type
¯ d. For any of the above-mentioned Nash equilibria of the original political
game and for any slight perturbation, therefore, there is no Nash equilibrium
in the perturbed game near that Nash equilibrium of the original game. Those
Nash equilibria are therefore not perfect equilibria.
For any of the remaining Nash equilibria, on the other hand, some propor-
tion between the two parties’ perturbations exists so that keeping this propor-
tion, the values of functions j and y in (12) converge to the level of Q-distance
of the Nash equilibrium strategies from the median type as perturbations go to
zero. This fact, together with the continuity of Q and the convergence of the
critical type to the median type, implies that those Nash equilibria are perfect
equilibria. This part of the claim is proved more formally below.










B is a perfect equilibrium if and only if one of the following condi-
tions is satisﬁed:
(i) m > ¯ d, 0 · x¤
B < x¤
A · ´ x, and Q(x¤
A; ¯ d) = Q(x¤
B; ¯ d);
3Here the convergence of the sequence of functions (gn) to 0 is in the sense that it converges to the
constantly 0-valued function from D.
25(ii) m > ¯ d and x¤
A = x¤
B · ¯ d;
(iii) m = ¯ d and Q(x¤
A; ¯ d) = Q(x¤
B; ¯ d);
(iv) m < ¯ d, ` x · x¤
B < x¤
A · 1, and Q(x¤
A; ¯ d) = Q(x¤
B; ¯ d); and
(v) m < ¯ d and x¤
A = x¤
B ¸ ¯ d.
Proof. The proof for the excluded Nash equilibria has been already done in the
above text. It only remains to show that there is a proportion of the parties’
perturbation against which any of remaining Nash equilibria is stable. Suppose
m > ¯ d. Note that for any b 2 (0;1)[(1;¥),
lim
(e;g)!(0;0)
j(be;e; ˆ d(g)) = lim
(e;g)!(0;0)
y(be;e; ˆ d(g)) =
m¡¯ d
1¡b : (13)
The right-hand side has range (¡¥;0) for b > 1. Recall that the perturbed
game has a Nash equilibrium such that 1 > xA > xB > 0 only if b > 1. But
the range of Q(¢; ¯ d) for the remaining Nash equilibria is contained in (¡¥;0].
By continuity of Q, therefore, Nash equilibria ([x¤
A];[x¤
B]) in (i) and (ii) of the
proposition except ([0];[0]), whose Q(¢; ¯ d)-value is 0, are perfect equilibria sta-
ble against the perturbation with proportion b such that Q(x¤
A; ¯ d) = Q(x¤
B; ¯ d) =
(m ¡ ¯ d)=(1¡b). Finally,
lim
(e;g)!(0;0)
j(e2;e; ˆ d(g)) = lim
(e;g)!(0;0)
y(e2;e; ˆ d(g)) = 0:
This proves that ([0];[0]) is a perfect equilibrium. The case m < ¯ d is similar. If





n=1 converging to (0;0;0) such that for all n, ˆ d(gn)= m and en
A =en
B,
the statement of the proposition is proved. This is indeed possible by (iii) of
Lemma 1.
The set of cut-off point pairs of perfect equilibria in a political game with a
uniform q is illustrated in Figure 4, where the dashed line represent the set of
non-perfect Nash equilibria.
Proposition 4 states that if the distribution of random variable q is biased
toward the right (left) relative to the median type, Nash equilibria in which
both parties switch around points greater (less) than the median type are not
perfect equilibria. This is a direct consequence of Corollary 3 describing the
relation between the relative ex ante popularity of policies in the original polit-
ical game and the Nash equilibria in a perturbed game. Thus these non-perfect
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Figure 4: Perfect equilibria
positive probability. In the proof of the proposition, however, we argued that
there exists some proportion of the parties’ error probabilities against which a
Nashequilibrium isstable. Thissuggests thatwe mustfurther examinewhether
there are perfect equilibria that are stable against any direction of perturbation.
7 Strictly perfect equilibrium
In this section, we study the problem of complete stability raised at the end
of the previous seciton through analysis of the strictly perfect equilibrium of
Okada (1982). After deﬁning an appropriate notion of strictly perfect equilib-
rium in our setting, we will show that the only strictly perfect only the corner
perfect equilibria are strictly perfect.
We deﬁne the strictly perfect equilibrium in a political game as follows.
Deﬁnition 15. A strategy proﬁle ([x¤
A];[x¤
B];(t¤
d)d2D) 2 S£S£Õd2DT, where
[x¤
I] is a two-step strategy for each I 2 fA;Bg, is a strictly perfect equilib-





n=1 with limn!¥rn = (0;0;0), and for some number N, there is a
sequence of strategy proﬁles in the perturbed games ˆ G(rn) in which the par-











, satisfying the following conditions:
















27Remark . If we seek to follow the original deﬁnition of strictly perfect equilib-
rium rigorously, even if we put aside that our political games are not ﬁnite, we
have to let the set of perturbations for party I include all functions eI :X ![0;1]
whose value eI(x) represents the error probability of I at x 2 X. We thus have
made a restriction on the set of possible perturbations , which may bring about
some weakening on the requirement of strict perfectness. Similarly, continu-
ity assumption of g may be some weakening. It thus remains open whether a
strictly perfect equilibrium by Deﬁnition 15 satisﬁes the same conditions in the
deﬁnitionifweallowforamoregeneralsetofperturbations. Ontheotherhand,
since we restricted equilibrium strategies in perturbed games to the class of cut-
off strategies, the existence of a sequence of Nash equilibria in perturbed games
in Deﬁnition 15 is a stronger condition than allowing all strategies to consist
in Nash equilibria of perturbed games. It is therefore still unclear whether the
above deﬁnition is a necessary or it is a sufﬁcient condition for a strategyproﬁle
to be a strictly perfect equilibrium according to the original deﬁnition.
By Corollary 3 and several facts used in the proof for Proposition 4, we ﬁrst




B]) such that 0 < x¤
A;x¤
B < 1.
Proof. Suppose that m 6= ¯ d. Then, by (i) and (v) of Corollary 3, the equations
(13), and continuity of Q, for any interior Nash equilibrium ([x¤
A];[x¤
B]) of a
political game, there exists a particular proportion b of parties’ perturbations
such that the value of Q(¢; ˆ d(g)) of any Nash equilibrium in any perturbed
game with this proportion b converges to the value of Q(¢; ¯ d) of x¤
I, I =A;B, as
perturbations goes to zero. (Recall that ([x¤
A];[x¤
B]) is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if Q(x¤
A; ¯ d) = Q(x¤
B; ¯ d)) as shown in Corollary 1.) Thus by continuity of
Q, for any interior perfect equilibrium in the original game, there exists some
b such that any sequence of Nash equilibria of perturbed games with this b
converges to another Nash equilibrium of the original game. Therefore, no
interior perfect equilibrium is strictly perfect.
The following proposition shows that only (part of, when m = ¯ d) the corner
perfect equilibria are strictly perfect. As we have stated before, in perturbed
games, thecornerNashequilibriaalwaysexist. Moreover, asFigure7suggests,
these equilibria converge to the corner perfect equilibria as perturbation goes
to zero. This is the main idea of the proof.





cal game, where the mean of q is m and the median type with respect to F is ¯ d.
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Figure 5: Strictly perfect equilibria
(i) ([0];[0]), ([´ x];[0]), and ([0];[´ x]) if m > ¯ d;
(ii) ([1];[0]) and ([0];[1]) if m = ¯ d;
(iii) ([1];[1]), ([` x];[1]), and ([1];[` x]) if m < ¯ d.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 5 illustrates the set of strictly perfect equilibria of incomplete infor-
mation political games in which q is a uniform random variable, and m 6= ¯ d,
where the dashed lines represent the set of Nash equilibria.
When a corner strategy pair is chosen by the parties, at least one party sticks
to announcing one particular policy independent of what value of q it has ob-
served. Proposition 5 states that such strategy pairs are strictly perfect, and
which policy is constantly chosen by a party depends on the relative ex ante
popularity of policies in the political game. As noted earlier, the main reason
for the robustness of such a corner Nash equilibrium is that for any slight per-
turbation, there exists a corner Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game near
that equilibrium. This implies that an inelastic party in the original Nash equi-
librium keeps on choosing one policy with probability as large as possible even
after perturbation is introduced. Thus the notion of strictly perfect equilibrium
in our model requires at least one party not only to take a constant strategy in
the original political game but also to do so even if small imperfection in its
rationality is introduced.
There is also a remarkable feature in the voters’ beliefs about q consis-
tent with strictly perfect equilibria. Consider, for example, a political game
with m > ¯ d and a strictly perfect equilibrium (sA;sB) = ([´ x];[0]) in this game.
29For this strategy pair, EsA;sB(qj1;0) = ¯ d, while EsA;sB(qj0;1) is not deﬁned






n=1 is a sequence of Nash equilibria in perturbed





B(qj0;1) = E(qjq > ´ x) > ¯ d:
That is, any belief of voters consistent with (sA;sB) would expect, on average,
q to be higher than ¯ d if (0,1) were observed, while EsA;sB(qj1;0) = ¯ d. Since
a larger level of q implies that the policy 1 is unpopular among the voters, it
then prevents party B to deviate from taking policy 0. Such public image on
the policy pair (0,1) is derived only from the equilibrium strategy of party A,
due to the stubbornness of party B. Having observed announcement (0,1), the
voters consider that even party A takes policy 0 and therefore it is probable that
the value of q is considerably large.
8 Concluding remarks
We have constructed incomplete information political games with Downs type
parties in which the parties have informational advantage over voters. We have
shown the existence of multiple Nash equilibria and perfect equilibria, and
proved that Nash equilibria with strongest asymmetry in the parties’ strate-
gies are strictly perfect. Possibility of policy divergence in Nash equilibrium
depends on the effect of voters’ beliefs on fundamentals that is consistent with
the strategies of the parties. A policy that is unpopular among citizens ac-
cording to the prior information about fundamentals is relatively unlikely to be
chosen in perfect equilibria. We have also shown that in any strictly perfect
equilibrium, at least one party adopts the sticky strategy selecting an ex ante
popular policy independent of observed fundamentals.
The results concerning the Nash equilibrium can be extended to more stan-
dard settings where policy spaces have uncountable cardinality. Indeed, if for
any level of fundamentals variable, there are two policies with supporters of
equal masses, then multiple Nash equilibria including policy divergence ex-
ist. In such a model, however, equilibrium reﬁnement would be much more
difﬁcult than the present model.
We may also generalize the uncertainty environment to include incomplete
information of parties as well as voters, where both parties and voters receive
private signals of fundamentals prior to elections. In such a case, on one hand,
voters have two sources of information about fundamentals variable: their sig-
nals and parties’ policy announcements. Each party, on the other hand, in-
30fers from its private signal what signals its opponent and voters have received.
Bernhardt et al. (2007) develop, somewhat relatedly, a model of political
parties with private information about the distribution of voters’ preferences,
where the set of signals for each party is ﬁnite, while assuming complete in-
formation on the side of voters. These extensions and generalizations are left
open for future research.
9 Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Lemma 2 . Statement (i). The statement is easily veriﬁed by noting
that the function lg is strictly decreasing with
lg(0) = 1¡G(1) > 1
2 and lg(1) = G(1) < 1
2; (14)
if g is close enough to the constantly zero-valued function so that at any d, the
marginal change in G does not dominate the increase in F.
Statement (ii). To prove this, ﬁrst note that the convergence of a sequence
of continuous functions from a closed interval into R to a continuous function
is uniform. Thus, if (gn)¥
n=1 converges to the constantly 0-valued function, then
the convergence is uniform. Therefore, if we deﬁne a function Hn : D ! R by
Hn(d)=F(d)¡2Gn(d) for every d 2D, then the sequence (Hn)¥
n=1 uniformly
converges to F. Also, since Hn is strictly increasing by (i), we have the inverse
function (Hn)¡1 : [0;1¡2Gn(1)] ! D for every n. Also, by (14), there is a
closed interval D ½ D such that 1
2 2 D and for every n, the domain of (Hn)¡1
contains D. Thus by what we have noted above, the sequence ((Hn)¡1jD)¥
n=1
uniformly converges to F¡1jD. Now, let dn = 1




for all n large enough, dn 2 D and (Hn)¡1(dn) = ˆ d(gn).
Hence, by continuity of F¡1, for any e > 0, there is a number N such that
for all n > N,










ˆ d(gn) = ¯ d.
Statement (iii). The statement is proved using the fact that for any voters’
perturbation function g which has the critical type, ˆ d(g) is less than, or equal
to, or greater than ¯ d if and only if G(¯ d) is less than, or equal to, or greater than
1
2G(1), respectively. It is clear that, for example, there is a sequence (gn
1)¥
n=1
converging to 0 such that for every n, Gn(¯ d) < 1
2Gn(1).
31Proof of Corollary 3 . Conditions (i) and (v). Suppose m 6= ˆ d(g), eA 6= eB, and
0 < xB · xA < 1. Then, substituting (7) into the equation system
EsA;sB(qj1;0) = EsA;sB(qj1;0) = ˆ d(g) (15)
in(i)ofProposition3, where(sA;sB)=([xA]eA;[xB]eB), andsolvingforQ(xI; ˆ d(g)),
I = A;B, yield the two equations
Q(xA; ˆ d(g)) = j(eA;eB; ˆ d(g));Q(xB; ˆ d(g)) = y(eA;eB; ˆ d(g)) (16)
in the conditions (i) and (v) of Corollary 3. (16) has no solution such that
xA = xB under the above assumptions. Note that
m > ˆ d(g); eA < eB =) j(eA;eB; ˆ d(g)) > m ¡ ˆ d(g) = max
x2X
Q(x; ˆ d(g));




Thus, if m > ˆ d(g);eA <eB, or if m < ˆ d(g);eA >eB, then there exists no solution
to (16) such that xB · xA. Also, note that
eA > eB =) j(eA;eB; ˆ d(g)) > y(eA;eB; ˆ d(g));
eA < eB =) j(eA;eB; ˆ d(g)) < y(eA;eB; ˆ d(g)):
(18)
Since, by the property (i) in Lemma 1, function Q(¢; ˆ d(g)) is decreasing on
[0; ˆ d(g)] and increasing on [ˆ d(g);1], there are at most two solutions to (16)
such that 0 < xB · xA < 1 in each possible case: if m > ˆ d(g) and eA > eB,
strategy pairs with pairs of cut-off points such as (xA;xB) and (x0
A;xB) in the
left-hand graph of Figure 6; if m < ˆ d(g) and eA < eB, strategy pairs with pairs
of cut-off points such as (x0
A;xB) and (x0
A;x0
B) in the right-hand graph of Figure
6. Therefore, in particular, if m > ˆ d(g), there exists no Nash equilibrium such
that ˆ d(g) · xB · xA; if m < ˆ d(g), there exists no Nash equilibrium such that
xB · xA · ˆ d(g).
Conditions (ii) and (vi). Substituting (7) and xB = 0 into the equation
EsA;sB(qj1;0) = ˆ d(g) in (ii) of Proposition 3 and solving for Q(xA; ˆ d(g)) yield
the equation in (ii) of Corollary 3. If this equation is satisﬁed, then the inequal-
ity in (ii) of Proposition 3 is necessarily satisﬁed. Thus, the condition (ii) in
Corollary 3 is equivalent to the condition (ii) in Proposition 3. The equivalence
result between the condition (vi) in the corollary and the condition (iv) can be
similarly proved.
Condition (iv). If eA = eB, the two equations in (i) of Proposition 3, when
seen as equations for two unknowns Q(xI; ˆ d(g)), I = A;B, are linearly depen-
dent, and have a solution if and only if m = ˆ d(g). Also, the solutions in this
case are all (Q(xA; ˆ d(g));Q(xB; ˆ d(g))) such that Q(xA; ˆ d(g)) = Q(xB; ˆ d(g)). ¤
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Figure 6: Function Q and interior NE in perturbed games with eA > eB
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Figure 7: Function Q and corner NE in perturbed games with eA > eB
Proof of Proposition 5 . By Corollary 4, the possible strictly perfect equilib-
ria of G are the eight strategy pairs which appear in the conditions (i)-(iii) of
Proposition 5.




for each (x;d) 2 X £(Dnfmg).
Then, properties that correspond to the properties (i) and (ii) of function Q
stated in Lemma 1 follows:
(i) For each type d 2 [0;m), the function ˜ Q(¢;d) is continuous, decreasing
on [0;d], increasing on [d;1], and takes values ˜ Q(0;d) = 0, ˜ Q(1;d) = 1.
(ii) For each d 2(m;1], ˜ Q(¢;d) is continuous, decreasing on [0;d], increasing
on [d;1], and takes values ˜ Q(0;d) = 0, ˜ Q(1;d) = 1.
Statement (i). Suppose that m > ¯ d. Let ˆ G(r) be a perturbed game with g
closeenoughto0sothat ˆ d(g)<m. Then, byCorollary4, (sA;sB)=([xA]eA;[xB]eB)
33canbeaNashequilibriumof ˆ G(r)forall(eA;eB)2(E£E)\V forsomeneigh-
borhood V of (0;0) in R2, only if (sA;sB) satisﬁes the condition (ii) or (iv) of
Proposition 3.
Consider the condition (ii) of Proposition 3. The constraints for the condi-
tional expectations in (ii) are rewritten as
˜ Q(xA; ˆ d(g)) = ¡
eA
1¡2eA and ˜ Q(xA; ˆ d(g)) ·
1¡eA
1¡2eA. (20)
If m > ˆ d(g), the inequality in (20) is satisﬁed for any eA 2 E.
Notethattheconvergence lim
d<m;d!¯ d
˜ Q(¢;d)= ˜ Q(¢; ¯ d)isuniformsince ˜ Q(¢;d),
d 2 D, and ˜ Q(¢; ¯ d) are continuous and their domain X is compact. Hence, by
the statement about the function ˜ Q(¢;d) with d < m in (ii) of Lemma 1, there
exist a;b > 0 such that for all d 2 (¯ d ¡a; ¯ d +a), the function ˜ Q(¢;d) is de-
creasing on [0; ¯ d ¡b] and increasing on [¯ d +b;1]. Thus, for such a, there exist
g > 0 such that for all d 2 (¯ d ¡a; ¯ d +a) =: Ba(¯ d), functions xd : [¡g;0] ! R
and hd : [¡g;1] ! R given by
for each z 2 [¡g;0], ˜ Q(xd(z);d) = z, and for each z 2 [¡g;1], ˜ Q(hd(z);d) = z
(21)
are well-deﬁned. If we deﬁne two other functions x : [¡g;0] ! R and h :
[¡g;1] ! R by
for each z 2 [¡g;0], ˜ Q(x(z); ¯ d) = z, and for each z 2 [¡g;1], ˜ Q(h(z); ¯ d) = z;
(22)
the families of functions (xd)d2Ba(¯ d) and (hd)d2Ba(¯ d) uniformly converge to x
and h as d ! ¯ d again by continuity of the functions and compactness of their
domains. Note that x(0) = 0 and h(0) = ´ x. Therefore, by the same reasoning



































libria in ˆ G(r) and ˆ d(g) ! ¯ d as g goes to the constantly 0-valued function by
the statement (ii) of Lemma 2, it has been veriﬁed that ([0];[0]) and ([´ x];[0])
are strictly perfect equilibria of G. By symmetry between the parties, ([0];[´ x]).
is also a strictly perfect equilibrium.
Statement (iii). Similarly, using the condition (vi) of Proposition 3 and the
statement (ii) of Lemma 1, (iii) of Proposition 5 can be proved.
Statement (ii). Suppose that m = ¯ d. In this case, ´ x = 1 and ` x = 0 by deﬁni-





n=1 of the voters’ perturbations, each converging to 0, such that ˆ d(gn
1) <
¯ d = m and ˆ d(gn
3) > ¯ d = m for all n. Thus, from the proofs of the statements
(i) and (iii), the possible strictly perfect equilibria are ([1];[0]) and ([0];[1]).




n=1 with the above properties,















equilibria in perturbed games ˆ G(en
A;en
B;gn




B) = (1;0) and lim
n!¥(bn
A;bn











n=1 of Nash equilibria in
perturbed games ˆ G(en
A;en
B;gn




B) = (1;0) and lim
n!¥(dn
A;dn
B) = (0;1) (24)
Furthermore, by the condition (iii) of Corollary 3, if m = ˆ d(g2), ([1]eA;[0]eB)
and ([0]eA;[1]eB) are Nash equilibria of any perturbed game ˆ G(r) with the vot-
ers’ perturbation g2.




















B); if m <








B); and if m = ˆ d(gn), let
(xn
A;xn
B) = (1;0) and (yn
A;yn







B) = (0;1). Therefore, ([1];[0]) and ([0];[1]) are indeed
strictly perfect equilibria. This completes the proof for the statement (ii).¤
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